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Toward an Economics of the Slowdown in the West 
Edmund Phelps* 
The West is in crisis – and so is economics. Economies are in a 50-year 
slowdown. Rates of return on investment have shrunk. Wages – and incomes 
generally – are stagnating for most people. Job satisfaction is down, especially 
among the young, and more working-age people are unwilling or unable to 
participate in the labor force. Many in France decided to give President 
Emmanuel Macron a try. Many Americans decided to give Donald Trump a try. 
And many in Britain looked to Brexit to brighten their lives. 
Yet economists have been largely mute on the underlying causes of this 
crisis and what, if anything, can be done to restore economic vigor. It is safe to 
say that the causes are not well understood. And they will not be understood 
until economists finally engage in the task of reshaping how economics is 
taught and practiced. In particular, the profession needs three revolutions that it 
still resists. 
The first concerns the continuing neglect of incomplete knowledge. In the 
interwar years, Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes launched a radical 
addition to economic theory. Knight’s 1921 book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 
argued that firms deciding whether to make an investment often have little 
sense of what profit it might bring – a condition later dubbed “Knightian 
uncertainty” in contrast to known risk. Keynes’s 1921 book, A Treatise on 
Probability argued that many actions cannot be based on known probabilities.1 
What, then, are actions based on? Keynes, commenting in 1933 on America’s 
worsening Depression, spoke of the importance of maintaining business 
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“confidence.” And in his 1936 tome, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money he says that the ups and downs of much investment are 
generated by “animal spirits.”2 But subsequent generations of economic 
theorists generally disregarded this breakthrough. To this day, despite some 
important work on formalizing Knight’s and Keynes’s insights (most notably 
by Roman Frydman and his colleagues), uncertainty – real uncertainty, not 
known variances – is not normally incorporated into our economic models.3 (A 
much-discussed calculation by Robert Barro and Jason Furman, for example, 
made predictions of business investment resulting from Trump’s corporate 
profits tax cut without bringing in Knightian uncertainty.)4 The Uncertainty 
Revolution has still not succeeded. 
Second, there is still a neglect of imperfect information. In what came to be 
known as the “Phelps volume,” Microeconomic Foundations of Employment 
and Inflation Theory, we brought to light a phenomenon overlooked by 
economists.5 Over-estimation by worker of wage rates outside their towns 
brings inflated wages and thus abnormally high unemployment; under-
estimation brings bargain pay levels and thus abnormally low unemployment. 
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When workers lose their jobs in, say, Appalachia they have little idea – no 
well-based estimate – of what their wage would be outside their world and how 
long it might take to find a job; so they might remain unemployed for months 
or even years. There is a deficiency of information. (That differs from 
“asymmetric information.”)  
More than that, the volume sees every actor in the economy as being thrown 
back on whatever sense he or she can make of it, as Harold Pinter depicted in 
some early plays, and to do the best they can, as Voltaire urged in Candide. But 
theorists at the University of Chicago created a mechanical location model in 
which a person’s unemployment is normally frictional and transitory – the so-
called island model.6 As a result, the Information Revolution has not yet been 
absorbed.  
The last great challenge is the utter omission from economic theory of 
economic dynamism. While economists have come to recognize that the West 
has suffered a massive slowdown, most of them offer no explanation for it. 
Others, wedded to Schumpeter’s early thesis on innovation in his classic 1912 
book The Theory of Economic Development, infer that the torrent of discoveries 
by scientists and explorers has shrunk to a trickle in recent times.7 
Schumpeter’s theory operated on the explicit premise that the mass of people in 
the economy lack inventiveness. (He famously remarked that he never met a 
businessman with any originality.) 
This was an extraordinary premise. One can argue that the West as we know 
it – the modern world, we might say – began with the great scholar Pico della 
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Mirandola, who argued that all mankind possesses creativity. And the concerns 
of many other thinkers – the ambitiousness of Cellini, the individualism of 
Luther, the vitalism of Cervantes, and the personal growth of Montaigne – 
stirred people to use their creativity. Later, Hume stressed the need for 
imagination and Kierkegaard the acceptance of the unknown in. Nineteenth-
century philosophers such as William James, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Henri 
Bergson embraced uncertainty and relished the new. 
As they reached a critical mass, these values produced indigenous 
innovation throughout the labor force. The phenomenon of grassroots 
innovation by virtually all sorts of people working in all sorts of industries was 
first perceived by the American historian Walt Rostow in 1952 and described 
vividly and voluminously by the British historian Paul Johnson in 1991.8 I 
discuss its origins in my 2013 book Mass Flourishing.9 
So it was by no means clear that the Schumpeterian thesis would be 
incorporated into economic theory. But when MIT’s Robert Solow introduced 
his growth model, it became standard to suppose that the “rate of technical 
progress,” as he called it, was exogenous to the economy.10 So the idea that 
people – even ordinary people working in all industries – possess the 
imagination to conceive of new goods and new methods was not considered. 
And it would have been dismissed had it been mooted. The Dynamism 
Revolution in economic theory was put on hold. 
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With the great slowdown and a decline of job satisfaction, however, there 
now appears to be a chance to introduce dynamism into economic modeling. 
And doing so is imperative. The importance of understanding the newly 
stagnant economies has sparked an effort to incorporate imagination and 
creativity into macroeconomic models. I have been arguing for a decade or 
more that we cannot understand the symptoms observed in the Western nations 
until we have formulated and tested explicit hypotheses about the sources, or 
origins, of dynamism. 
That theoretical advance will give us hope of explaining not only the slow 
growth of total factor productivity, but also the decline of job satisfaction. 
America cannot be America again, nor France be France again and Britain be 
Britain again, until their peoples are once again engaged in thinking of better 
ways to do things and excited at embarking on their voyages into the unknown. 
 
* Edmund Phelps, winner of the 2006 Nobel Prize in Economics, is Director of the 
Center on Capitalism and Society at Columbia University. He is the author most recently 
Rewarding Work (1997, 2007) and Mass Flourishing (2013.) 
 
